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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
CONCLUSION
The Constitutional provision for the promotion of science and the useful arts
through the encouragement of authors and inventors is the basis for our pres-
ent copyright and patent systems. The Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein
broadly construed the scope of copyright protection by holding that a copyright
will not be denied because of its intended use or use in industry as an article of
manufacture. In so holding the court came to the conclusion that the two statu-
tory schemes may overlap and the mere fact that an article is patentable is not
determinative of whether or not it is copyrightable.
Two questions, however, remain open. The first is whether or not an author
or designer may obtain protection for his work under both statutory schemes,
or whether an election of one precludes the other. This issue has been the
subject of much controversy.80 The second and more basic question was brought
up by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in the principal case:
whether the term "writing" as used in the Constitution can be so broadly in-
terpreted as to cover items such as statuettes, bookends, clocks, lamps, and
other objects not popularly associated with that term.81 This latter question
bears serious implications and could conceivably lead to a restricted concept
of regulation and protection under both statutory systems.
Federal Practice: Diversity of Citizenship: Federal Court's Power to Dis-
regard Old Decisions of Highest State Court: Aintorg Trading Co. v.
Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953).-For the
first time since the decision in Erie v. Tompkins' a United States Court of
Appeals, sitting in a diversity action has asserted its power to refuse to follow
a decision of the highest court of the state whose law was applicable. The
Amtorg Trading Company had contracted to purchase a number of printing
presses from the defendant, advancing twenty-five per cent of the purchase
price. Amtorg, unable to secure a license to export the presses to Russia,
repudiated the contract. The defendant manufacturer subsequently sold the
presses to the United States government for a higher price than Amtorg had
contracted to pay. Amtorg, the defaulting purchaser, brought suit in federal
district court for restitution of its down payments.
Under a series of decisions extending back to 1881,2 New York has not per-
mitted a defaulting plaintiff to obtain restitution of pre-payments. The harsh-
ness of this rule has been severely criticized. 3 Pursuant to a recommendation
consideration of public policy which will prevent the issuance of both a copyright and
a patent to cover the same work, in its different aspects . . ."; Pogue, "Borderland-Where
Copyright and Design Patent Meet," 52 Mich. L. Rev. 33 (1953); Notes 66 Harv. L.
Rev. 877 (1953); 21 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 353 (1953) ; 27 Ind. L. J. 130 (1951).
80 See cases cited note 79 supra.
81 Mazer v. Stein, 74 Sup. Ct. 460, 472 (1954).
1 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
2 Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131 (1881); Pirman v. Kurtz, 267 App. Div. 258, 45
N.Y.S.2d 508 (3d Dep't 1943); Waldman v. Greenburg, 265 App. Div. 827 (2d Dep't
1942); Bisner v. Manteli, 197 Misc. 807, 95 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Rensselaer County Court 1950);
Restatement, Contracts, N.Y. Annot. § 357 (1933).
3 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1122 (1951); Restatement, Contracts § 357 (1932); Corbin,
"The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to The Restitution of Instalments Paid," 40 Yale LJ.
1013 (1931).
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of the Law Revision Commission,4 the New York Legislature in 1952 enacted
section 145-a of the Personal Property Law to permit defaulting buyers to
secure restitution of pre-payments which are in excess of seller's damages. How-
ever, this statute was not applicable to the instant case since the contract had
been executed prior to the effective date of the statute. Nevertheless, the
United States Court of Appeals felt that the statute, together with other
decisions and statutes of New York,5 constituted a change in the state's public
policy.6 The court felt that the decision required an application of the new
public policy rather than the old cases. 7 Accordingly, plaintiff was allowed to
recover its pre-payments insofar as they were in excess of damages suffered by
the seller. After this rather thorough discussion of New York law, the court
proceeded to base its actual holding on what was perhaps a somewhat strained
interpretation of the Foreign Aid Appropriations Act which was intended to
provide relief for American exporters and producers who were injured by de-
nials of export licenses.8 Nevertheless, the court's carefully considered dictum
concerning its powers in interpreting state law undoubtedly constituted a con-
scious attempt to free itself from some of the narrow restrictions which have
developed since Erie v. Tompkins.
FnDING STATE LAW
The holding in Erie v. Tompkins was a simple one: "Except in matters gov-
erned by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the state."9 However, numerous problems have arisen
in the application of this simple rule. Not the least of them has been the ques-
tion of the sources to which federal judges may resort to determine the law of
the state. Justice Brandeis, in the Erie case, referred to enactments of the
legislature or decisions of the highest court of the state as the applicable state
law.10 In 1940 four cases came before the Supreme Court which involved the
issue of how the federal court was to proceed when the highest court of the
state had not yet passed on the question of state law. In three of these cases,
4 1952 Leg. Doc. 65(c). Previously recommended, 1942 Leg. Doc. 65(f), 1942 Report,
Recommendations and Studies, N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n 179.
5 The court cited the following "mitigating doctrines" which are available in New York
to protect a defaulting plaintiff: (1) Spence v. Ham, 163 N.Y. 220, 57 N.E. 412 (1900)
(substantial performance doctrine); (2) N.Y. Labor Law § 196 (severability of employ-
ment contracts); (3) N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 125 (1) (permitting vendor to recover for
part performance); (4) N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 79, 80, 80-a (purchaser under conditional
sale may recover any surplus after resale by seller).
6 In recent years the courts have increasingly used statutes as guides for decisions in
cases not covered by statute. Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381 (1939). See Page,
"Statutes as Common Law Principles," [1944] Wis. L. Rev. 175, 213: "Practicing lawyers
could help the courts, and incidentally themselves, by making greater use of principles
taken by analogy from legislation.'
7 206 F.2d at 107. "A statement by us of New York law in terms of the old cases might
turn out to be more hazardous a colurse than boldly to try to look into the womb of time,
however nfuch that course may be decried.'
8 62 Stat. 1059 (1948). The application of this statute is noted critically in 67 Harv.
L. Rev. 347 (1953).
9 304 U.S. at 78 (1937).
10 Ibid.
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the question had been determined by intermediate courts of those states."1 In
the fourth case, Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field,12 the point had been passed
on only in unappealed decisions of New Jersey trial courts. In each of the
four cases the Supreme Court held that the federal courts must follow the deci-
sions of the lower state courts, even though the federal judge believed them
to be erroneous. These decisions and particularly the decision in the Field
case evoked a storm of criticism from commentators' 3 and federal judges.' 4
It was argued that the litigant is deprived of the opportunity of contesting the
rule of law laid down by a state trial or intermediate court in an action between
different parties. If the action had been brought in the state courts the prin-
ciples of stare decisis would not be so rigid as to prevent the litigant from seek-
ing to have the decision overruled. This is especially unfortunate if the litigants
in federal court have a great deal more at stake and are represented by more
able counsel. The result seemed to reinstitutionalize the practice of "forum
shopping," so roundly denounced in Erie v. Tompkins.'5 The astute attorney
will bring his action in federal court, if diversity of citizenship exists or can be
manufactured by assignment or reincorporation, confident that if there is any
state decision in point favoring his client the case will not be lost. He thus
avoids the possibility of having the decision overruled. An even more vicious
possibility has been opened up. If John Doe contracts with A and B and if
Doe recovers against A in an uncontested or "friendly" suit in state court, the
rule of law laid down by the state court would be binding on B as effectively as
if the judgment of the state court had been res judicata as to him. This situa-
tion is more than imaginary; it has already been attempted with some success.' 6
Many of the decisions implementing the Field case, as well as the criticisms
of its holding, result from too rigid an interpretation of what was actually de-
ll Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway District, 311 U.S. 180 (1940); West
v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Stoner v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940)).
12 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
33 The litigant "must submit her fortunes to the decision of a court that can read, but
must not reason." Corbin, "The Laws of the Several States," 50 Yale LJ. 762 (1941) ; Broh-
Kahn, "Uniformity Run Riot-Extensions of the Erie Case," 31 Ky. LJ. 99 (1943); Keefe,
Gilhooley, Bailey, Day, "Weary Erie," 34 Cornell L.Q. 494 (1949).
14 "Why shokuld we abdicate our judicial functions and even prostitute our intellectual
capacities to discover not state law, but the particular views a state judge may have
uttered many years ago." judge Clark, "State Law in Federal Courts: The Brooding Omni-
presence of Erie v. Tompkins," 5S Yale L.J. 267, 291 (1946). "Thus the total tendency
of the Erie Railroad doctrine has a strong reactionary direction which it is hard to believe
its proponents and expansionists appreciated." judge Wyzanski, "A Trial Judge's Freedom
and Responsibility," 7 Record 280, 299 (1952).
15 See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 73 (1937), discussing the much attacked decision
in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1928).
16 In Meredith v. Winterhaven, 141 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1944) the court was faced with
what it called a "made" state decision which it felt it was bound to follow, but then
distinguished it on narrow grounds. See Michael H. Cardozo, "Federal Taxes and the
Radiating Potencies of State Court Decisions," 51 Yale LJ. 783 (1942) for a discussion
of the use of "made" state decisions in federal tax litigation and analogous situations com-
ing under Erie v. Tompkins. See also, Oliver, "The Nature of the Compulsive Effect of
State Law in Federal Tax Proceedings," 41 Calif. L. Rev. 638 (1953).
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cided. The rule of federal practice it laid down was essential to preserve what
had been gained in Erie v. Tompkins. It was necessary to make clear to the
federal courts that in diversity suits they must in fact follow the law of the
states and not their own notion of what the law should be. However, the case
has been unfortunately interpreted by judges and commentators to mean that
the federal court is powerless to decide that the decision of a lower or inter-
mediate court of a state is erroneous or that the vitality of the decision of the
highest court of a state is sapped.17 Judge Clark's opinion in Amtorg v. Miehle
attempts to rectify that misconstruction of the Field case and his attempt is
justified by ample authority. In the Field case itself, Chief Justice Hughes
spoke of the authority of the New Jersey lower court as "evidence" of state
law.'8 That analysis was repeated in the companion cases. In Six Companies
of California v. Joint Highway District, Chief Justice Hughes again said that
the intermediate court of California should be followed since "there is no con-
vincing evidence that the law of the state is otherwise."'19 Justice Stone in
West v. American Telegraph & Telephone Co. spoke of the decision of an in-
termediate court as "datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disre-
garded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that
the highest court of the state would hold otherwise." 20  This view was reiterated
by Justice Murphy in the same year.21
It is difficult to reconcile the court's statements that decisions of intermediate
state courts are "evidence" of state law, with the actual holdings of the cases.
In each of the four cases the court held that the federal courts must follow
the state decisions, seemingly holding that those decisions are conclusive evi-
dence of state law. The key to the apparent conflict between the rigid holdings
and less stringent dicta is to be found in the circuit court opinions in these four
cases. In each case the circuit court rendered its decision as though Swift v.
Tyson 22 had not been overruled. The eighth circuit in the Stoner case dis-
cussed the issue in one sentence: "We are not bound to follow the decisions
and reasonings of the intermediate courts of Missouri.123 The sixth and ninth
circuits gave the subject almost as brief a treatment.2 4  The third circuit in
the Field case discussed the applicability of the Erie case at some length, but,
relying on numerous pre-Erie decisions, concluded that the decisions of the
New Jersey vice-chancellors would be entitled only to some consideration 2 5
The Supreme Court felt that the federal judges were attempting to emanci-
17 See Keehn v. Excess Ins. Co., 129 F.2d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1942); and Fox v. Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co., 107 F.2d 715, 719 (8th Cir. 1939). Both courts refused even to
discuss the possibility of refusing to follow a high court decision even though lower court
opinions were cited to show that the decision might no longer be followed.
18 311 U.S. 169, 177 (1940).
19 311 U.S. 180, 188 (1940).
20 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).
21 In Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464, 468 (1940), justice Murphy
stressed that the Missouri Supreme Court would probably hold as the intermediate courts
had. He held that the intermediate court should be followed absent "convincing evi-
dence that the Missouri Supreme Court would decide differently."
22 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842).
23 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Stoner, 109 F.2d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 1940).
24 West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 108 F.2d 347, 350 (6th Cir. 1939);
Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway District, 110 F.2d 620, 626 (9th Cir. 1940).
25 Field v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 108 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1939).
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pate themselves from the restrictions laid down in Erie v. Tompkins. They
read the circuit court opinions as attempts by the circuit judges to apply what
they considered the "better rule" rather than the state court's views.2 6  It is
significant that in all four cases the court left open the possibility of admission
of "persuasive data that the highest court would hold otherwise. '27  Several
years later the Supreme Court held that the decisions of unreported nisi prius
courts did not constitute binding authority.28 Justice Stone went further and
indicated that in some situations even the decisions of the highest court of the
state would not be considered sacred. He wrote:
. . The rulings of the Supreme Court of Florida ...must be taken as
controlling unless it can be said with some assurance that the Florida Su-
preme Court will not follow them in the future....29
The realization that the doctrine of the Field case is not as stringent as it
appears at first blush has come slowly to the federal courts. Judge Wyzanski
recognized its flexibility in 1947 and asserted his power to disregard state deci-
sions of doubtful vitality,80 as did the second circuit in 194131 and again in
Amtorg v. Miehle. It is submitted that the Supreme Court has indicated that
it would approve of the approach taken by Judge Clark in Amtorg v. Miehle.32
Unlike the courts in the Field, West, Stoner and Six Companies cases, Judge
Clark did not seek to apply what he considered the better rule, but based his
discussion on data consisting of New York statutes and cases which convinced
the second circuit that the New York Court of Appeals would depart from its
old decisions.
It has been said that the notion that judicial decisions are only evidence of
law is inconsistent with the more modem notion that judges do not merely
find law, but actually make law.33 Such a statement is an over-simplification.
Even though judges legislate, their decisions are usually retroactive in effect.34
In the interim between a decision which holds that x = y and a subsequent
overruling decisions of retroactive effect which holds that x =A y the only law
which exists on the proposition is a lawyer's prediction of what the court might
do in the subsequent case. 35 The first decision serves the lawyer only as strong
evidence of the outcome of the subsequent case.
26 See West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U.S. at 235. Justice Stone
interprets the lower court's decision as holding that the lower court "was free to adopt and
apply what it considered the better rule."
27 See notes 18, 19, 20, 21 supra.
28 King v. Order of United Commercial Traveler's of America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
29 Meredith v. Winterhaven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). Contrast this with a less flexible
statement by the same justice in West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 US.
222, 236-38 (1940).
30 Ashley v. Keith Oil Co., 73.F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1947).
31 Wickes Boiler Co. v. Godfrey-Keeler Co., Inc., 121 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1941).
82 To be contrasted are cases in which the federal court will refuse to guess at a possible
change in state law, as where a United States Supreme Court decision makes possible such
a change. See identical results reached in Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d
193 (1st Cir. 1948); and Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, 165 F.2d 33 (2d 01r. 1948).
33 E.g., Carpenter, "Decisions and the Common Law," 17 Col. L. Rev. 593 (1917).
84 But courts possess the seldom used power to restrict a decision to prospective opera-
tion only. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932).
35 However, a few courts -have held that a decision is "law" and relationships entered
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Justice Frankfurter asserted that the Erie decision "overrules a particular
way of looking at the law... Law was considered as a brooding omnipresence
of reason." What the court substituted was the Holmes theory that "the com-
mon law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice
of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified." 36  The sovereign
in common law jurisdictions often speaks through the judiciary, and "law,"
Holmes asserted in the same context, constitutes "prophecies of what the courts
will do in fact."3'7 judge Cardozo independently arrived at a definition of law
as prediction.38  Thus, when the United States Court of Appeals for the second
circuit applied New York law in Amtorg v. Miekle, it was its function to pre-
dict what the New York Court of Appeals would do if faced with the same
facts. Finding ample authority in the trends of New York law, it concluded
that New York would now allow quasi-contractual relief for a defaulting plain-
tiff. That the function of the federal court is to predict state law is also im-
plicit in Supreme Court holdings that the federal court must reach a decision
even if no state statutes or cases are in point or if they are in conflict.3 9 That
federal judges have adequately borne this task is shown by the cases.40 Per-
haps most important, the decision is congenial to the New York theory of stare
decisis as enunciated by the New York Court of Appeals:
A decision of a court of competent jurisdiction determines conclusively the
questions of law and of fact necessarily involved in the dispute between
the parties to the litigation. It does not conclusively determine anything
else. Though the determination of the questions of law involved in that
litigation may dictate a similar conclusion in litigation between other
parties where similar questions are involved, yet such parties may still
challenge the correctness of the original decision and the court may refuse
to follow it.41
This excerpt bluntly states the theory of stare decisis that has constantly
been implemented by the New York Court of Appeals and by the United States
Supreme Court, perhaps most notably in Erie v. Tompkins itself.42
into in reliance on a decision bcome vested rights and will not be taken away by an over-
ruling decision. See Warring v. Colpoys, 74 App. D.C. 303, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
36 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 101 (1945), quoting Holmes dissenting
in Southern Pacific R.R. v. Jensen, 224 U.S. 205 (1917). Also in Holmes, "The Path of
Law," 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 460 (1897).
37 Holmes, "The Path of Law," 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 460 (1897).
38 "We shall unite in viewing as law that body of principle and dogma which with a
reasonable measure of probability may be predicted as the basis for judgment in pending
or future controversies." Cardozo, The Growth of Law 44 (1924). See also Wu, "The
Juristic Philosophy of Justice Holmes," 21 Mich. L. Rev. 523, 530 (1923). Wu writes:
"One constantly refers, it is true, to past cases as so many depositaries of law, but in
the last analysis that is done almost always with the intention of showing that there is
sufficient ground for believing that the courts will act in such and such a way in the
future."
39 Meredith v. Winterhaven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
40 For an excellent analysis of how federal courts have reached their decisions when
state law was unclear, see Harnett and Thornton, "Precedent in the Erie-Tompkins Man-
ner," 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 770 (1949).
41 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 9th Avenue 31st St. Corp., 274 N.Y. 388, 400, 9 N.E.2d 20,
26 (1937).
42 See discussions of stare decisis in Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 150
(1921); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951). For an extreme depar-
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Judge Clark's statements in Amtorg v. Miekle are supported not only by
Supreme Court dicta and New York authority but also by the basic theory
underlying Erie v. Tompkins. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, Justice Frank-
furter made the statement that the federal court in diversity is "in effect only
another court of the state." 43  Certainly it is true that for most practical
purposes it does act as a state court in that it applies state law. But, an im-
portant practical distinction exists between a suit in federal district court and
one in state nisi prius court. The litigant in federal court has no right of
appeal to the highest court of the state. It is, therefore, important to keep
in mind that the federal judiciary is the creation of a separate sovereignty.
State law is applied in diversity suits by command of the federal Judiciary Act
of 178944 and the Constitution as interpreted by Erie v. Tompkins. The fed-
eral court sits, then, not as a lower court of a state, but as a. court of another
sovereignty attempting to reach the same result that would be reached by
the highest court of the state, not the lowest court.45 It may also be noted that
even lower courts sometimes anticipate decisions of the highest court of their
own jurisdiction and refuse to follow an old decision which is likely to be
overruled.4 6
The rule of Erie v. Tompkins seeks conformity between state decisions and
federal diversity decisions. Conformity cannot be achieved if federal judges
are rigidly required to follow old or weak precedents which the state court
would be disinclined to follow. 47 Nor, of course, will absolute conformity be
achieved if the federal court is permitted to predict the state law on the basis
of the latest trends within the state, for the state may reaffirm a seemingly
weak precedent. 48  To choose between these two alternatives we must look
to the jurisprudence of Holmes and Cardozo, adopted by the Supreme Court
in Erie v. Tompkins, which stands for the proposition that law is no more nor
less than a prophecy of "what courts will do in fact." We must also ask our-
selves whether the outcome of litigation should depend upon the merits of a
controversy or upon an attorney's astute choice of a federal court where the
judge must serve as a "ventriloquist's dummy"49 for whatever a state court
may have expressed as its opinion in the distant past.
Joseph M. Perillo, Jr.
ture from stare decisis see West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943), overruling Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
43 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
44 1 Stat. 92 (1789) 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1946), as amended, 62 Stat. 944 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
1652 (1949).
45 Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank of Wichita Falls, 306 U.S. 103 (1939).
"The court below correctly stated that by reason of the removal it had been substituted
for the Texas Supreme Court as the appropriate court of appeal and it was its duty to
apply the Texas law as the Texas court would have declared and applied it on a second
appeal if the cause had not been removed."
46 See Comment, "The Attitude of Lower Courts to Changing Precedents," 40 Yale L.J.
1448 (1941).
47 To achieve conformity the federal court could remand the case to the state court
for decision on matters of state law. But this has been done only where the constitu-
tionality of the state law is called into question and never in a diversity case. See Frank-
furter, dissenting in Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1948).
48 Only in a unitary judicial system could nearly absolute conformity exist. For a
discussion of the Australian system, see Dixon, "Address to Bar Association," 17 Ahst. LJ.
138 (1943).
49 See Richardson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942).
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